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Philippine Social Movements and 
Contemporary Contestations over 
Models of Economic Development1
This paper provides an overview of Philippine social 
movements that have challenged the dominant models of 
economic development through three major periods in the 
country’s history, i.e., the pre-martial law, martial law, and 
post-martial law periods. The major bone of contention was 
the need to address poverty, underdevelopment, and glaring 
socio-economic inequalities. A foremost advocacy is the need 
for agrarian reform, as well as the search for a development 
alternative to the International Monetary Fund/World Bank 
development model which emphasizes liberalization, the 
market, and privatization, as enshrined in the current neo-liberal 
development framework. The struggle of social movements 
and their advocacies and strategies is contextualized during 
the changing political and economic dispensations during 
these time periods. Gains and increments have been attained 
in pursuing their goals and objectives, but social movements 
continue to confront an arduous challenge, given the hegemony 
of the alliance of local and global elites.
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INTRODUCTION
The nature of contestations over models of economic development 
in the Philippines is best understood in the context of the perennial 
existence of underdevelopment, poverty, and socio-economic 
inequalities in the country. The Philippines in the 1950s ranked next to 
Japan as Asia’s best performing economy. This was only to drastically 
collapse in the 1970s under an authoritarian regime. In the 1980s, it 
was referred to as the “basket case” of the region. It never made it to 
the elite group of the New Asian Tigers of Thailand, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia. The downfall of the dictatorship gave much hope that the 
country would be able to address its development woes. It was believed 
that corruption was the very cause of its poor economic performance. 
“Good governance” became the key term in addressing this. For the 
social movements in the country, however, it was the nature of the 
economic policies pursued by the elites in the country, as supported 
by multilateral agencies—e.g., the International Momentary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB)—which was the very cause of 
economic stagnation. Such economic policies espoused liberalization, 
privatization, and free competition, which intensified in an era of 
globalization under a neo-liberal development paradigm. Such a 
development model indeed brought growth to the country (e.g., the 
highest growth rate in the region in 2013). The problem, however, 
was that poverty incidence remained the same and the gap between 
the rich and the poor increased. Thus, contestations over models of 
economic development continue to ensue.
This paper thus attempts to give an overview on how Philippine 
social movements challenged the dominant models of economic 
development through three major periods in our history, i.e., the 
pre-martial law, martial law, and post-martial law periods. It will 
highlight the nature of the burgeoning of social movements in the 
forms they took—e.g., from revolutionary movements to non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). It will also look into the social 
movements’ relationship with politico-economic elites and the way 
such a relationship was shaped by social movements’ advocacies. Of 
importance, too, is how social movements’ advocacies and strategies 
were affected by the changing political dispensations and the manner 
in which the global economic environment impacted on Philippine 
social movements dynamics.
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THE FOUNDATIONS OF DEVELOPMENT 
CONTESTATIONS DURING THE PRE-MARTIAL 
LAW PERIOD (1948–1972)
The foundations of the nature of contestations over models of 
economic development in the Philippines were laid during the pre-
martial law period under the auspices of American colonial policy in 
the country. This nurtured an oligarchic elite which established a solid 
base in landownership. Because of this, the state subsequently failed to 
achieve autonomy from the dominant class in the Philippines (Sidel 
1999, 10). “American colonial policy also allowed these oligarchic elites 
to engage in rentier capitalism, which gave them a significant share 
of the nation’s economy and a simultaneous attenuation of central 
government control over the provinces. The privatization of public 
resources, thus, strengthened a few fortunate families while weakening 
the state’s resources and its bureaucratic apparatus” (McCoy 1994, 10). 
These families are referred to as Philippine political dynasties, which 
provided for the backbone of the emergence of the country’s oligarchy. 
The “oligarchy” is described as a subset of the “political family” (Park 
2008, 124). With political and economic power in their hands, these 
oligarchic elites controlled the key industries in the country, i.e., raw 
materials for export such as sugar and coconut. Given such a situation, 
the country’s economic growth expectedly did not trickle down to the 
majority, resulting into the prevalence of poverty, underdevelopment, 
and glaring socio-economic inequalities. This spawned an agrarian 
unrest which led to the emergence of the Partido Komunista ng 
Pilipinas (PKP) or the old Communist Party of the Philippines in the 
1930s. Under the auspices of the Soviet Union, it sought to bring land 
to tiller in the context of a Marxist-Leninist concept of society. The 
PKP-led communist movement was, however, easily quelled by US 
military force. Peasant unrest also led to the government’s institution 
of an agrarian reform, but this was inutile given the dominance of the 
country’s landed politico-economic elites.
THE NATIONALIST DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVE
In the 1950s, the landed elites began to venture into the manufacturing 
sector, providing the foundation of the Filipino industrial bourgeoisie 
and “projecting alternative strategies for development” (Rivera 1994, 3). 
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Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, too, “the closely held conglomerates 
of the major oligarchic families also became highly diversified units” 
(Hutchcroft 1998, 38). These families combined manufacturing, 
finance, agriculture, commerce, services, urban real estate, and other 
business interests, all under one roof (ibid.). The establishment or 
expansion of business ventures by the local elites included joint 
ventures with multinational corporations needing technocratic skills. 
Through the 1960s, “major elite segments and dominant families of 
the local manufacturing class were closely linked with foreign capital” 
(Rivera 1994, 83). The Philippine landed politico-economic elites 
would, however, also be divided concerning the nature of the economic 
development thrust they would pursue. A major bone of contention 
was those supporting the import-substitution development policy in 
the 1950s under the Macapagal Administration (1961–1965) against 
the export-oriented industrialization (EOI) development strategy. 
The latter was against the efforts of the country to establish their own 
capability for heavy industrialization through import-substitution 
(Lichauco 1981, 78).
The import-substitution policy was supported by the government’s 
foreign exchange control. This did not only favor the local elites who 
were in support of such a policy, but also became another source of 
American domination. It was under President Elpidio Quirino, who 
took over after the demise of President Manuel Roxas in 1948, whereby 
the rate of the two pesos to a US dollar was fixed and could not be 
adjusted (Sicat 2014, 127). This was upon the advice of Quirino’s set 
of economic advisers in 1949, headed by Central Bank Governor 
Miguel Cuaderno. Cuaderno “counseled the government to impose 
import and foreign exchange controls” (Sicat 2014, 127).  Because the 
Central Bank stuck to the exchange rate of USD1 to P1, Sicat (1988) 
noted that the country suffered the adverse effect of not having full 
monetary autonomy from the Americans. He further observed that 
such a situation was aggravated after independence because of the 
delayed adjustments in the value of the peso. This produced serious 
economic policy errors. Sicat pointed out that foreign exchange was 
made cheaper through an overvalued exchange rate, “or government 
policy wished them to remain cheap to feed to preferred users. The 
result of was massive misallocation of resources” (Sicat 2014, 127).
The Marcos technocrats, which included Sicat, sought a shift in 
such a policy under the auspices of the IMF and the WB advisers 
in the 1960s. They campaigned for a decontrol program which they 
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described as a return to free trade (Hawes 1984, 263). The technocrats, 
some of whom have undergone training with these financial institutions 
assumed the role of the major implementers of free enterprise in the 
country. They preached on the need to abandon government protection 
and to meet multinational competitors on an equal basis in the free 
market (Lichauco 1981, 78). Through the Macapagal Administration’s 
Program Implementation Agency, which became the Presidential 
Economic Staff later on, technocracy pressed for an open door policy 
to foreign investments and foreign loans, mainly from the IMF.
Such a policy was opposed by the nationalist politico-economic 
elites who found allies in the burgeoning left movement in the 
country given the government’s failed agrarian reform program amidst 
growing poverty. In 1969, there emerged the new Communist Party 
of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New People’s Army 
(NPA), and the National Democratic Front (NDF), its illegal united 
front. This was breakaway faction from the PKP and carried with it the 
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist line, with support coming from the People’s 
Republic of China. Although it also advocated the armed struggle, 
its thrust was not in the urban areas as advocated by the PKP, but 
in the rural areas through guerrilla warfare and a protracted people’s 
war. Both members of the PKP and the CPP, through its united front 
strategies, forged links with the nationalist politico-economic elites 
particularly those in Congress and in the business community. Thus, the 
development contestations during this era were waged on two fronts. 
For the left movement, it was to push for agrarian reform through a 
revolution, and for the politico-economic elites, the debate was for 
protectionism versus the entry of American multinational corporations 
and the privileging of foreign investors over local investors in the 
context of liberalization. In relation to this, the CCP’s strategy, which 
is also generally that of other communist parties worldwide, was to 
unite with the national bourgeoisie to fight a common enemy, which 
was US imperialism and the politico-economic elites who allied with 
the United States and multinational corporations. In the CPP, this was 
done under the auspices of its NDF, which was at the forefront of the 
national democratic movement in the country.
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DEVELOPMENT CONTESTATIONS DURING THE 
MARTIAL LAW PERIOD (1972–1986)
On 21 September 1972, Marcos arrested this growing wave of 
nationalism by declaring martial law. He jailed his political opponents, 
including those from the landed elites, and to appease the growing 
agrarian unrest, he issued Presidential Decree (PD) No. 2 on 26 
September 1972, declaring the entire country a land reform area. On 
21 October 1972, Marcos promulgated PD 27, emancipating the tiller 
from the bondage of the soil. PD 27 was aimed to transform tenants 
in rice and corn areas as “owners” of the land they were tilling through 
a system whereby the tenant could begin to purchase their farm lands 
on installment. Those who remained as tenants would be shifted from 
share to fixed-rent leasehold tenancy (Quintana 1989, 134). Agrarian 
reform during the martial law period was, however, rendered a failure, 
and one of the major reasons was that it did not include sugar and 
coconut lands. These two agricultural crops were the top dollar export 
earners of the country during the 1970s, with Philippine coconut exports 
amounting to 60 percent of the total number of coconuts exported 
during this period. These industries were controlled by Marcos’s “chief 
cronies,” Roberto Benedicto and Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., respectively. 
The landed elites who were associated with Marcos continued to rule, 
and he also created new landed elites which transformed themselves 
into political dynasties. As during the pre-martial law period, the 
theory of rent seeking continued to characterize elite politics, and 
crony capitalism flourished under the regime of Ferdinand Marcos 
(McCoy 1994, 10).
Together with the president’s cronies/relatives and the military, the 
technocracy became one of the three legs which propped up the martial 
law regime. The nationalist technocrats were kicked out of government 
and the IMF/WB technocrats provided the leadership with a credible 
development program which was endorsed by the foreign agents of 
development. Foremost of this nationalist economists was Hilarion 
Henares, who was the Chairman of the National Economic Council 
(NEC) under the Macapagal Administration. Henares believed that 
importance should be placed on industrialization and, in particular, 
the propagation of import-substitution industries (UNTV [n.d.]). 
Under the Marcos pre-martial law administration, the Chairman 
of the NEC was Filemon Rodriguez, who also advocated for heavy 
industrialization and protectionism. Cesar E. A. Virata, who was 
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Marcos’s Secretary of Finance, did not agree with this development 
view of Rodriguez and replaced him with Gerardo Sicat. Virata agreed 
more with Sicat who advocated for liberalization and export-oriented 
industrialization (Virata 2007).
Thus, the Marcos technocrats continued to pursue their export-
oriented development strategy and propagated the massive entry of 
foreign capital through foreign investments and loans, as well as the 
removal of all restrictions on trade. They also facilitated the entry 
of the Philippines into the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff 
(GATT).
The curtailment of political and civil rights, however, did not 
bring about economic development and, worst, aggravated the poverty 
situation, particularly in the countryside. Joint ventures between 
state corporations manned by the technocracy with multinational 
corporations (MNCs) also produced severe socio-economic 
consequences on local communities which were not directly involved 
in the transnationalization process in the country. One grave social 
consequence of state and MNC alliance was the eviction and relocation 
of Filipino communities occupying lands favored by foreign and state 
corporations. Small farmers, fisher folk, and a number of the urban 
poor were forced to evacuate their land and sea locations to pave the 
way for industrial and agricultural projects, like the establishment of 
export processing zones, a copper sintering plant, a nuclear plant, and 
export-crop plantations (Lim 1983, 19). Tribal Filipino communities 
have also been vanquished from their ancestral lands to pave the way 
for infrastructure, like dams to provide electricity and irrigation in 
order to entice foreign capitalists to business ventures in the far-flung 
places of the country. This led to the cultural genocide of at least 4.25 
million Filipinos (Rocamora 1979, 2). This repressive situation led to 
the rapid growth of the communist insurgency in the country. This 
is understandable as during the martial law era, economic policies 
which were carried out during the pre-martial law period continue to 
dominate. That is, the push for liberalization, as was epitomized by the 
Philippine joining the GATT-WTO (Word Trade Organization), as 
well as more incentives for foreign investors, particularly in the form 
of MNCs and preference for export-oriented industrialization over 
import-substitution industries. The failure of the martial law regime 
to also implement a comprehensive agrarian reform law, as it only 
covered rice and corn lands, continued to fuel agrarian unrest in the 
countryside, as led by the CPP-NPA-NDF.
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Although the armed struggle was the primary source of change 
by the CPP-NPA-NDF, it also realized that there was a need for the 
impoverished sectors of society to survive amidst the military repression 
and the growing poverty. Such a view was also shared by sympathizers 
of the CPP-NPA-NDF, as well as by foreign governments and 
European NGOs that saw the need to help the poor in the countryside 
but that did not want to course the economic assistance through the 
government. This was because of the fear that it would be pocketed 
by the corrupt dictatorship. This led to the growth of developmental 
NGOs (for further details, please see Encarnacion 1988).
THE GROWTH OF THE 
ANTI-DICTATORSHIP MOVEMENT
For the local business community, they tolerated the corruption of the 
dictatorship as they saw this as a better alternative to what the CPP 
was advocating for. The 1981 economic crisis, however, as spawned by 
the 1979 Iran-Iraq war that raised the price of oil to about US$36 per 
barrel, among others (Virata 2008), brought a change in perspective. 
They articulated that the country’s current economic crisis was due to 
the inability of the regime to curb graft and corruption and the lack 
of accountability of the public officers. Local businessmen also voiced 
their resentment concerning the bailout of crony companies during the 
economic crisis at the expense of others who did not have the proper 
connections to the regime and thus could not avail of the regime’s 
rescue funds (Bello et.al. 1982, 151). These businessmen showed their 
disapproval of the technocracy’s blind loyalty to the policies of the 
IMF/WB group which led to the centralization and the streamlining 
of the local economy benefitting only foreign investors and not their 
local counterparts. All these have led to the elimination of small- and 
medium-scale industries and commercial industries in the country, as 
well as the foreign domination of the economy. This economic policy 
made these businessmen allies of the CPP and its supporters in the 
anti-dictatorship struggle, as they both resented crony capitalism 
and the adverse effects of the IMF/WB policies in the country. Their 
alliance was given impetus with the assassination of Marcos’s chief 
opponent, ex-Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, in August 1983. This 
paved the path for the 1986 People Power Revolution in the country 
which saw the downfall of the Marcos dictatorship.
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NGO DEVELOPMENT WORK AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM
The 1986 People Power Revolution ushered in old as well as new 
dimensions to the nature of the development contestations which 
ensued during the pre-martial law and martial law periods. The 
NGO alternative development paradigm, which emerged during 
the martial law period, was pursued (for further details, please see 
Encarnacion 1988), and it harped on the need to bring development 
directly to the community through NGOs with the support of foreign 
assistance—i.e., not from IMF/WB but from foreign NGOs and 
even governments. Emphasis was placed on the establishment of self-
reliant economies and not on the production of commodities for the 
world market, as exemplified in an export-oriented industrialization 
development paradigm. This economic endeavor was a source of people 
empowerment in the context of the repressive dictatorship. The local 
businessmen, now under a new political dispensation, did not want the 
corruption of the martial law era, which for them was a major source of 
economic underdevelopment. In terms of the economic policies, they 
were against the IMF/WB policies that favored big businesses and 
foreign investors, which for them were killing off small- and medium-
size enterprises.
These development perspectives would pervade in a post-martial 
law context which continued to witness dominance of the old oligarchy 
and traditional political families during the Aquino (1986–1992) and 
Ramos administrations (1992–1998) (Park 2008, 126).Thus, the elites 
continued to dominate the Philippine economy. This domination was 
epitomized by powerful landowners preventing the establishment of 
an agrarian reform law. Although the Aquino government passed the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or Republic Act (RA) 
6657, the majority of the peasant and farm workers’ organizations 
rejected this. Thus, despite the fact that the president, during her 
electoral campaign and after coming to power, emphasized that the 
major redistribution of agricultural land was to be the cornerstone of 
her administration’s economic policy, the government failed to pass an 
agrarian reform law that effectively and efficiently addressed the needs 
of the Filipino farmers. This failure, however, was also not a surprise, 
as the Aquino government’s anti-people economic policies can only 
be explained by the domination of her cabinet as well as of Congress 
by policymakers who come from the conservative big business class, 
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political clans, and landowning elite. Thus, ever after the 1986 People 
Power revolution, 20 percent of the total population continued to 
own 80 percent of the country’s agricultural lands (Almojuela 1992, 
4). Furthermore, in terms of economic policies, there was not much 
difference with regard to the development policies that the Aquino 
government pursued, as compared to that of the martial law regime’s. 
That is, Aquino continued to pursue the development prescriptions of 
the IMF and WB.
Such a situation heightened the debate within the CPP, whether 
to seek reforms in the system or to pursue the armed struggle. On 
the one hand, political change had indeed occurred with the ouster 
of the dictatorship. But on the other hand, the elites, which included 
Mrs. Aquino, continued to dominate Philippine society. This had an 
impact on the CPP debates on the role of development work carried 
by NGOs which are associated with the NDF movement. For a long 
time, development work was viewed as secondary to the armed struggle. 
There were, however, NDF mass organizations that believed that the 
socio-economic projects these organizations were setting up and 
implementing had a crucial role in the movement. More importantly, 
economic assistance should be channeled to these livelihood schemes 
rather than be used for buying arms. This debate together with other 
debates—e.g., whether to wage the struggle in the urban rather than 
the rural areas, and whether the rights of women, as well as those of the 
indigenous people’s should not be treated as secondary to the armed 
struggle—brought the split in the CPP on 10 December 1992. The 
split was between the “reaffirmists” (RAs) and the “rejectionists” (RJs). 
The RAs were those who maintained that the CPP should continue to 
adhere to the orthodox Marxist-Leninist and Maoist principles that 
they had advocated from the early days of the CPP—e.g., the armed 
struggle—while the RJs were those who rejected this. The RJs argued 
that the country was presently enjoying a “democratic space” which 
was not there during the dictatorship’s dark years. This paved the way 
for former CPP cadres involved in development work in nurturing 
relations with foreign NGOs to support such an effort.
THE FOSTERING OF NGO DEVELOPMENT WORK
This turn of events seems to also complement the thrust of foreign 
NGOs that believed that, with Marcos overthrown, now was the time 
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to focus on development work and it was into this where their financial 
assistance was to be channeled. NGO-to-NGO relations through 
development aid from foreign NGOs to local NGOs were also redefined 
with the end of the martial law period. There emerged the bias towards 
development work rather than funding for organizing the workers and 
the peasants. The reason for this was the perception that since democracy 
had been “restored” in the Philippines, development assistance should 
now be channeled for economic and development purposes rather than 
for political purposes—e.g., organizing the marginalized sectors of 
society. There were local NGOs, however, that did not agree with this 
and argued that there was still an important need to channel funds for 
organizing the workers and the peasants so as to empower them. Thus, 
Dutch NGOs such as CEBEMO, ICCO, and Nederlandse Organisatie 
voor Internationale Bijstand/Novib (Netherlands Organization for 
International Development Cooperation), which continued to be 
active in the Philippines during the post-martial law period, were 
geared towards this. A second strand was for foreign NGOs to channel 
funds directly to the popular Aquino government instead of through 
NGOs like during the martial law period. The reason for this was that 
the Aquino government, having risen to power through people’s power, 
“must be given all the assistance it needs to realize the aspirations of the 
revolution which she symbolized” (David 1988, 21).
CONFRONTING DEBT AND DEVELOPMENT
A major concern of the social movements was how the government 
can repudiate or declare a moratorium on the debt payments for the 
debts that were associated with the Marcos family. This was because the 
economy had not fully recovered and the burden of debt payments will 
certainly stymie the country’s development. The issue of the Marcos’s 
debts led to the rise of the Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC). 
The FDC consisted of a broad coalition of political blocs that were 
identified with the Philippine Left (Ariate and Molmisa 2009, 31, 34). 
The FDC had three basic calls as the focus of its advocacy (ibid.).
1. “Implement a moratorium on foreign debt-service 
payments until acceptable capable terms based on the 
country’s capacity to pay are won in a new agreement;
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2. “Disengage loans that did not benefit the people . . . ;
3. “Limit foreign debt-service payments to more than 10 
percent of export earnings to enable the country to 
finance its economic recovery.”
Funding for the FDC came from, among others, the following 
NGOs: “Bread for the World, Bank Information Center, Canadian 
Catholic Organizations for Development and Peace, United Church 
of Canada, Christian Aid, Cordaid, Global Greengrants, Novib, 
Oxfam-GB, Oxfam-Hong Kong, Swiss Catholic Lenten Fund, 
Trocaire Primate’s World Relief and Development Fund, Helvetas, 
and 11.11.11 (Coalition of the Flemish North South Movement in 
Belgium—a pacifist group)” (ibid., 40–41).
Foreign funding enabled the FDC to contribute to the global 
discourse on freedom-from-debt advocacy, as its campaign against 
odious debt (earlier referred to as “tainted” loans) was supported by 
very specific examples, like the case of the Philippine Bataan Nuclear 
Plant (BNPP) (ibid., 46). The BNPP, a white elephant funded by multi-
billion dollar loan from the US Eximbank, became the international 
symbol of the debt issue. The FDC and its international partners 
also took advantage of the multilateral financial institutions’ (MFIs) 
policies, such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative to 
advance the debt-relief issue. It was instrumental in the formation 
of the Asia Pacific Movement on Debt and Development or the 
Jubilee South Asia-Pacific. One of its major objectives was “to bring 
together debt and development movements and organizations from 
Africa, Asia-Pacific and South America—the so-called global South” 
(ibid., 48). FDC was thus an example of a local NGO which had gone 
transnational in its advocacy campaigns as its major targets are the 
MFIs.
The post-martial law period therefore witnessed the continuation 
of the demand for agrarian reform and the need for development to 
reach the countryside through NGO development work, i.e., economic 
policies which addressed the marginalized sectors of society. A new 
development model of contestation also emerged with the issue of debt 
and (under)development because of the massive loans accumulated 
by the dictatorship that did not benefit the Filipino people. Such a 
development thrust also had its support from foreign funders.
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THE CRITIQUE AGAINST THE NEO-LIBERAL 
DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM
Aside from the need from agrarian reform, Philippine social 
movements continued to confront liberalization as the country’s major 
development paradigm. This issue of contention that emerged during 
the pre-martial law period and that pervaded during the martial 
law period, continued to dominate the post-martial law era. The era 
of globalization in the early 1990s, however, brought forth a new 
dimension into this model of contestation.
Neo-liberalism as a development paradigm, as advocated by 
the IMF/WB, was further strengthened in the Philippines. This 
paradigm, which placed emphasis on deregulation, privatization, and 
liberalization, attracted a broad spectrum in Philippine society. 
This included government officials, the local business community, 
University of the Philippines economists, as well as NGOs (Tadem 
2005, 93). Neo-liberals also became known as “free marketeers,” whose 
admiration for the virtues of the market and EOI included criticism 
of crony capitalism. Unlike the martial law technocrats, the neo-
liberal coalition of the 1990s advocated reducing the state’s role in 
the economy. Known as “free marketeers,” neo-liberals admired the 
virtues of the market and the EOI. As they are also known for their 
harsh criticism of crony capitalism, they advocated for reducing the 
state’s role in the economy during the 1990s. A reason for this was 
they blamed the collapse of the Philippine economy to Marcos cronies 
who intervened in the market for the personal gain of a few (ibid.). 
The neo-liberal development paradigm is also perceived to perpetuate 
American hegemony through globalization. This perpetuation is done 
by multilateral institutions, e.g., the IMF, the WB, and the WTO, 
which are dominated by the United States and European countries.
CONTESTATIONS OVER PRIVATIZATION AS THE 
MODEL FOR DEVELOPMENT
This provided the ideological foundation for the push for privatization 
under the Ramos administration (1992–1998), an economic policy 
emanating from the government’s advocacy for liberalization as 
seen during the pre-martial law and martial law periods. Although 
the impetus already came in the ouster of Marcos in February 1986, 
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with a study by academics advocating for privatization, the Aquino 
administration did not pursue this because the President refused to break 
up monopolies, except those identified with Marcos and his relatives. 
She protected her own family’s monopoly of the telecommunications 
industry with the Cojuangco-controlled Philippine Long Distance 
Telephone Co. The study in general prescribed to limit government 
intervention in areas where it can do better. The major targets of the 
privatization efforts were in two valuable social services, i.e., the power 
and water sectors. Between these two sectors, the privatization of the 
energy sector has proved most costly.
The major advocates of energy privatization—i.e., the WB and the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB)—have both argued that this was 
needed due to the following factors: One was that state-run utilities 
have been unable to adequately expand access to electricity and 
ensure reliable supply. Another was that the state sector was finding 
it more difficult to meet the financing needs of new investments 
and maintenance (Malaluan 2003b, 9). Another justification for 
privatization was based on the belief in the efficiency of its logic. 
This was because technological developments and increase in market 
demand combine to diminish the natural monopoly character in 
certain aspects of the industry, particularly in power generation. The 
ADB and WB were one in concluding that the dominance of the 
sector by public sector monopolies for a long time has resulted in high 
costs, poor service, bad investment decisions, and lack of innovation 
(Malaluan 2003a).2
NGOs, however, argued against raising the following issues: 
One argument was that of private sector fundamentalism. Although 
they recognized the argument that privatization and deregulation 
could break up monopolies or cartels, lower prices, improve product 
efficiency, and mobilize investment, they also pointed out that 
that the private-is-necessarily-better framework was too centered 
on commercial principles and marginalized non-economic but 
also important objectives. Moreover, they argued that history was 
replete with evidence of the efficacy of development planning, social 
regulation, and institutional intervention in achieving socio-economic 
goals. Another argument against privatization was that the Philippine 
experience has shown that replacing government with the private 
sector will not reduce corruption and rent-seeking, which has generally 
characterized public sector operations. An example of this was seen 
in the independent power producer (IPP) incident, wherein a report 
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made by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) 
pointed out that then President Fidel Ramos “personally pushed 
for the speedy approval of some of the most expensive power deals 
and justified signing more contracts” despite warning of impending 
oversupply (cited in Avendaño 2003). Furthermore, “individuals linked 
to Ramos lobbied for the approval of some IPP contracts, which came 
with numerous other deals, including lucrative legal, technical, and 
financial consultancies that were given to individuals and companies 
close to the former president” (ibid.). Despite these arguments, RA 
9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) was signed 
into law on 8 June 2001. EPIRA is the most comprehensive legislation 
mandating the full privatization of the electric power industry in 
the Philippines. This law provides for the vertical unbundling of the 
electric power industry into four sub-sectors: generation, transmission, 
distribution, and supply. Its two major elements are deregulation and 
privatization.
A validation of the criticisms of NGOs on the adverse effects 
of privatization was seen recently when the Manila Electric Co. 
(Meralco), the country’s biggest electric company, announced a 
price hike in late 2013 of P4.15 per kilowatt increase that would 
affect its 5.3 million customers. This drew public outrage, including 
government officials who were fearful of the political backlash this 
would cause. Even government realized that with the deregulation 
of the energy sector, it had no control of electricity price hikes. This 
prompted a Senator to announce that he would file a bill seeking to 
repeal the EPIRA of 2001, stating that the government reacts to the 
people’s plight but businessmen do not (Esguerra 2014a). No less than 
President Benigno Aquino has also warned that power firms who 
have passed on warranted additional costs to consumers will suffer 
from the consequences (Esguerra 2014b). Under the current Aquino 
administration, privatization is further given impetus in the form 
of privatization via public-private partnerships. “The major concern 
is such partnerships are now occupied by former executives of big 
corporations involved in electricity generation and distribution, water 
distribution, infrastructure, real estate and telecommunications” (Uy 
2010).
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CONTESTATIONS OVER THE WTO AND CHANGING 
TRADE RULES AND REGULATION
The other major bone of contention concerning development models 
in the country is the Philippines’ accession into the WTO. Such a 
contestation, like privatization, is a spin-off from the debates which 
emanates from the policy of liberalization that pervaded during the 
pre-martial law and martial law periods.
The Philippines, compared to its neighbors Indonesia and Thailand, 
“carried out much earlier and more widely the policies of deregulation 
and privatization, especially those that related to agriculture” (Bernabe 
and Quinsaat 2009, 5). In 1994, in particular, the economists predicted 
the following benefits from the implementation of the Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) of which were the following (ibid., 10):
1. “Expansion of export markets for the Philippines as a 
result of trade liberalization;
2. “Greater consumer welfare as consumer prices were 
expected to go down due to increases competition; and
3. “Increased employment and livelihood opportunities in 
the rural sector.”
None of these happened as the Philippines transformed from a 
net agricultural exporter to a net agricultural importer. Furthermore, 
developed countries continued to maintain high levels of unfair 
support for their agricultural producers (ibid., 12).
It was in this context whereby the Stop the New Round (SNR) 
Coalition was formed. The SNR is a “broad grouping of public interests 
groups and individuals that spearheaded a Philippine campaign against 
the launching of a new round of negotiations in the WTO” (Quinsaat 
2009, 62). Focus was placed on the Fifth Ministerial Conference of 
the WTO in Cancun on 10–14 September 2003. The SNR members, 
especially the NGOs, have rich transnational ties, and its donor 
agencies have been involved in the transnational campaigns to address 
the adverse effects of privatization, deregulation, and liberalization in 
the South. These donor agencies include the following: Development 
and Peace, the official development agency of the Catholic Church in 
Canada, which has been implementing its advocacy of public control 
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of water for common good across North American since 2003; the 
Coalition of Flemish North-South Movement in Belgium, which 
supports NGOs working on the impact of policies of international 
financial institutions (IFIs) on the quality of public services, 
especially water and electricity, the consequences of agricultural trade 
liberalization, and the struggle for land reform of small peasant and 
indigenous peoples; and Oxfam Great Britain and Oxfam Novib, both 
of which are implementers of the global campaign Make Trade Fair, 
who call on governments, institutions, and multinational companies 
to change the rules so that trade can be part of the solution to poverty 
(Quinsaat 2009, 77, 78). Philippine social movements, therefore, are 
able to draw from the support of their counterparts in the First World 
in their advocacy against the WTO.
STRATEGIES OF CONTESTATIONS IN A PERIOD OF 
DEMOCRATIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION
The period of democratization and globalization have brought about 
various strategies of contestations which were not present during the 
martial law period. In the post-martial law period, the three areas of 
government—i.e., the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary—
became key areas for social movements, civil society, and NGOs, 
among others, for advocating an alternative development model.
USING THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA
The anti-energy privatization campaign, for example, saw NGOs like 
the FDC building and strengthening their key allies in Congress. It 
was also through this arena where they sought to expose the power 
relations among the legislators and private interests in the energy 
sector. The intervention of public interest advocates in the privatization 
process picked up when Congress tackled the bill to restructure the 
power industry. FDC was a leading critical voice when the sponsors 
of the bill pushed its passage in the 11th Congress beginning in 1998. 
The FDC engaged the committee hearings by raising the injustice 
of passing the burden of the National Power Corporation (Napocor) 
debts and the onerous IPP contracts to the national government 
and consumers. After the ouster of President Joseph Estrada on 20 
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January 2001, the FDC and Action for Economic Reform engaged 
in the consultations conducted by the executive department and the 
bicameral conference committee, and worked closely with allies in 
Congress—e.g., Rep. Loretta Ann Rosales—to raise issues against the 
House and Senate versions of the bill.
For the movement against changing trade rules and regulations, 
the Philippine Congress was also used by farmers’ organizations and 
civil-society groups in making “policymakers aware of the need to 
provide safety nets to the agricultural sector” (Bernabe and Quinsaat 
2009, 23). These groups argued that these safety nets were needed due 
to the sector’s unpreparedness to compete in the world market (ibid.).
PRESSURE ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
For the executive branch, the immediate target of the groups was the 
Philippine president. FDC, for example, pressured then President 
Estrada to suspend further privatization programs pending its 
thorough review. They also sought to engage the executive of the 
Department of Energy (DoE) and Napocor, the key government 
agencies tasked with privatization in a debate on technical issues. 
NGOs also mobilized to pressure President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo not to flip-flop on her original decision to study all possible 
option regarding the problems of Napocor and the electricity sector 
(Freedom from Debt Coalition [n.d.], 2).
In the case of the WTO, civil society has exerted pressure on 
the government bureaucracy for negotiations to be transparent 
and accountable. Civil society’s criticism of the formulation of the 
Japan-Philippine Economic Partnership Agreement, for example, 
was focused on the absence of transparency regarding how the 
Department of Trade and Industry handled the bilateral agreement 
between the Philippines and Japan. This led to contentious debates in 
the Philippine Senate between civil society groups and government 
officials on issues such as Philippine sovereignty and environmental 
destruction among others, leading to month’s delay in the ratification 
of the treaty.
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THE SUPREME COURT
The recent Meralco electricity price hikes issue has led to the filing 
of petitions in the Supreme Court by party-list lawmakers and a 
group of electricity consumers and homeowners associations. The 
petitioners claimed that their constitutional right to due process was 
violated when the DoE and the Energy Regulatory Board allowed 
and approved the increases without conducting public hearings. 
(Aning 2014). On 23 December 2013, the Supreme Court issued 
a 60-day temporary restraining order on Meralco from collecting 
the P4.15 per kilowatt increase. In late December 2013, the Court 
“temporarily restrained Meralco from collecting the price increases. 
The Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), called the Meralco 
increase as resulting from the collusion of power generation firms” 
(Esguerra 2014a).
CIVIL SOCIETY COLLABORATION WITH 
“REFORMIST” TECHNOCRATS
The collaboration of civil and society and government “reformists-
minded” technocrats was witnessed during the advent of 
democratization and globalization. As noted, the WTO AoA chief 
negotiator and Department of Agriculture (DA) Undersecretary 
Segfredo Serrano collaborated with civil society groups in the 
formulation of the country’s negotiating position. What brought 
them together was their fight against “the developed countries’ 
policies of limiting market access for the produce of developing 
countries and the subsidies they provide for the produce of their 
domestic market” (Tadem 2009, 46).
This concern facilitated the creation of the Task Force on WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture (TF-WAAR). This Task Force was 
organized in September 1998 by then-DA Secretary William Dar 
through a special order. TF-WAAR (which later on became TF-
WAR) in 2001, is a multisectoral consultative bod.  It is composed of 
twenty-eight representatives from state institutions and agencies who 
have a key participation in trade policymaking and stakeholders.3 Its 
main responsibility is to consider, develop, evaluate, and recommend 
Philippine negotiating positions and strategies on agriculture (ibid., 
48).
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“The participation of the TF-WAR was further enhanced when 
the DA, hoping to augment the technical skills they have already 
possessed, actively sought their expertise in negotiations” (ibid., 51). 
Civil society, through the TF-Core Group, was able to frame “the 
Philippine concerns in a manner that the members of the coalition 
blocs in the Group of 20 (G204) Developing Countries and the 
Alliance on Strategic Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism 
(more popularly known as the G335) could identify with” (ibid., 52).
LOCAL NETWORKING AND ALLIANCE BUILDING
In all these undertakings, importance is placed on the need to form 
networks, alliances, as well as coalitions at the local, regional, and 
international levels to challenge the proponents of the neo-liberal 
development paradigm. Networking and alliance-building is not 
only limited to NGOs and legislators, but also extends to affected 
sectors of the community and other sympathetic individuals and 
groups. This has made possible, for example, the mobilization of 
constituencies, networks, and allies both for material and manpower 
support in the campaigns against the power reform bill (Freedom 
from Debt Coalition [n.d.], 2). As for the alliance against the AoA, 
the “negative impact of liberalization on the livelihood of many small 
producers created a broad spectrum of organization and networks 
lobbying against liberalization” (Bernabe and Quinsaat 2009, 23). An 
example of this is the Alyansa Agrikultura (Agricultural Alliance)—a 
coalition of agricultural producers, which includes vegetable growers, 
livestock and poultry raisers, crop farmers, etc.—which has lobbied the 
government to address, among other things, the problem of excessive 
importation (ibid.).
INTERNATIONAL NETWORKING AND ALLIANCES
As for international alliances, this is best seen in the bigger rubric of 
the anti-globalization movement challenging the neo-liberal ideology 
with emphasis on liberalization, privatization, and unhindered market 
competition. The SNR, for example, has linked up with the Our World 
Is Not for Sale (OWINFS) transnational movement. Both the SNR 
and the OWINFS share a commitment “to prevent another unjust 
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round of WTO agreements” (Quinsaat 2009, 77). The OWINFS is an 
“all loose grouping of organizations and activists worldwide that grew 
out of the international campaigns against the Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment (MAI) and the WTO. Acting as a ‘hub’, the OWINFS 
coordinates exchange of information and analysis, and links initiatives 
of country-based campaigns of social movements and NGOs to make 
international strategies against the WTO and trade liberalization 
more effective” (ibid., 77). The SNR is also an example of “an event-
based coalition that was the result of an active and consultative process 
of formulating a strategy of the WTO undertaken in the transnational 
public sphere and that gained footing in as it adapted to Philippine 
conditions” (ibid., 62). Headway was made with the collapse of the 
Cancun ministerial meeting. This highlighted the “crisis within the 
multilateral trade organization, brought mainly by the difference 
in position of developed and developing countries” (Bernabe and 
Quinsaat 2009, 28). The anti-globalization alliances also carry with it 
issues which concerns the liberation of women, the preservation of the 
environment, and the rights of workers.
As for regional networking, it was also only recently that the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was considered 
the site of regional networking and alliances by Philippine and other 
NGOs and other civil society players. As noted by Nesadurai (2012, 
167), “many CSOs [civil society organizations] had not tried very 
hard to engage ASEAN before the 1997–8 Asian Financial Crisis. 
Instead they directed their advocacy work towards the more powerful 
multilateral organizations, whose neo-liberal rules and programs were 
seen as more likely to undermine people’s well-being, rather than a 
weakly institutionalized ASEAN with little in the way of binding 
regional rules and programmes that could pose a threat.” Moreover, 
CSOs targeted their advocacy towards the Asian Pacific 
Economic Cooperation and Asia Europe Meeting which were 
seen as champions of neo-liberal economic governance. 
However, CSOs began to view ASEAN in a different light 
from the late 1990s and especially following ASEAN’s 
announcement in 2003 of its ASEAN Community project, 
which envisaged a deepening of regional integration first 
began under the ASEAN Free Trade Area. (ibid., 166)
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PROTEST ACTIONS AT THE NATIONAL, REGIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS
The campaign against the neo-liberal development paradigm has 
also been waged through protest actions at the national, regional, and 
international levels. Philippine social movements, for example, have 
joined hands with other social movements in participating, as well as 
following, the Battle of Seattle demonstrations in 1999, with “their 
own protests against the principal agents of globalization—the IMF, 
the WB, the WTO, and the Asian Development Bank” (Tadem and 
Tadem 2003, 168). In the cases of the anti-privatization movement, 
NGOs have targeted the annual governor’s meetings of the ADB. 
One of the biggest protest actions against the ADB, in which 
participated NGOs denouncing the Bank’s neo-liberal policies such 
as privatization, was the ADB’s 33rd annual conference in Chiang 
Mai in May 2000. Among those who spearheaded this protest were 
the following: the Asian NGO Coalition, which was formed in 1988 
and has systematically questioned ADB policies in the region; the 
Environmental Policy Institute (now referred to as Friends of the 
Earth US); and the NGO Forum on the ADB.
CHALLENGES TO CONFRONT
Despite incremental gains in their strategies of contestations, social 
movements continue to confront formidable challenges in their quest 
to highlight the adverse impact of the development models propagated 
by the Philippine government as supported by the IFIs. These include 
the following:
THE DOMINANCE OF THE 
POLITICO-ECONOMIC ELITES
The current controversy on the price hike on electricity brings to 
light again vested interests that continue to hound the privatization 
process in the Philippines. Evidence shows that that privatization of 
the energy sector has not reduced corruption and rent-seeking that has 
characterized public sector operations. Such a situation can only be 
explained because of the dominance in the private sector of politico-
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economic elites who are able to use their clout to attain their interests. 
Such was the manner in which the law that created EPIRA evolved 
in Congress. A special report by the Philippine Daily Inquirer in 1998 
identified Eduardo C. Cojuangco, Geronimo Velasco, and William 
Gatchalian as being interested in the privatization of the National 
Power Corporation’s (NPC) or NAPOCOR generation assets. These 
groups had their respective links to Malacanang appointees in the 
NPC Board then (Malaluan 2003b, 16). Connections in Congress 
and the Executive by politico-economic elites have allowed these 
power groups to exert considerable influence. Meralco, the electric 
company which had monopoly of the sector before the EPIRA, and 
its affiliates continue to exercise strong influence on the legislative 
process,which permeates key provisions of the EPIRA (IBON Facts 
and Figures2002, 14).
Such a situation links with the issue of participatory policies in 
the Philippines. Aside from the weight of the politico-economic elites, 
it is inherently tough work to mobilize around public interest issues 
given the resource constraints of public interest advocates and the 
political and ideological differences among them that limit coalition 
building. Blame is also placed on the more structural character of the 
Philippine state. 
As noted by Hutchcroft (1998, 13), access to the state apparatus 
“has been the major avenue to private accumulation as the quest for 
‘rent-seeking’ opportunities brings a stampeded of elites and would-be 
favored elites to the gates of Malacanang Palace.”  Huthcroft (ibid., 11) 
refers to this as booty capitalism whereby “the Philippine development 
quagmire can be traced in large degree to the endurance of a predatory 
oligarchy and a patrimonial state.”
The dominance of the politico-economic elites also explains why a 
genuine agrarian reform program in the country has not been pursued. 
As noted by 2003 Ramon Magsaysay awardee and journalist Sheila 
Coronel, “since the 1950s, land reform has been viewed as the key 
to rural productivity and national prosperity. But reform has been 
repeatedly blocked by elite-controlled legislatures or by presidents who 
owe their office to landlord patrons” (quoted in Donmakles [pseud.] 
2011). This is very much epitomized by the exemption by the Corazon 
Cojuangco Aquino administration’s CARL of the Cojuangco family’s 
Hacienda Luisita from agrarian reform under the stock option to the 
farmer clause (Tadem and Tigno 2006). For the moment, “Hacienda 
Luisita farmers are divided over a compromise deal with Hacienda 
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Luisita Incorporated (HLI) on how to distribute the land. Farmers 
have been given the option to get the land or shares of stocks in the 
hacienda” (Howard 2010). Critiques of the stock option scheme claim 
that the 6,000 farmers have been forced to sign the compromise 
settlement deal that gave them the option to either get farm lots in 
the 6,453-hectare plantation, or retain their stocks in the corporation 
(ABS-CBN News 2010). The Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa 
Hacienda(Alliance of Farmers Working in Haciendas) and the Unyon 
ng mga Manggagawa sa Agrikultura(Union of Agricultural Workers) 
have also called the land distribution in the Hacienda Luisita as a 
sham. Among the 10 reasons they gave was the “exclusion of hundreds 
of agricultural land from distribution” and “the exclusion of a number 
of bona fide farm workers in the final master list of beneficiaries, and 
the underhanded insertion of names of unqualified ones” (Philippine 
Daily Inquirer 2014).
THE HEGEMONY OF THE NEO-LIBERAL 
DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM
Another major challenge is the neo-liberal development paradigm 
model which has continued to persist despite the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis and the 2008 global economic crisis, which are testimonies of 
the failure of such a paradigm regionally and globally. This model was 
given further impetus with the Philippine economy’s expansion in the 
first quarter of 2013 to 7.8 percent, making the Philippine economy 
the fastest-growing in Asia and the poster-child of the IFIs (Remo 
2013). Such an impressive growth rate for economists is attributed 
to the remittances of 11 million Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) 
bringing in a revenue of US$21 billion a year in 2013. For 2014, OFW 
remittances are estimated to rise by 5 percent to a record high of 
US$22.5 billion. The other major sources of the growth rate are the 
Business Processing Operations or call centers (Montecillo 2014). The 
focus has been on the service sector. “The reliance of the government 
on OFW remittances and call centers, however, has brought down 
the number of industries in the country from about 200 in 1970s to 
around 10 now” (Uy 2010).
Despite this impressive growth rate though, the Philippines has 
one of the highest poverty rates among emerging Asian economies. 
The poverty incidence stood at 27.9 percent as of the first semester, 
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unchanged from the 28.6 percent in 2009 (Remo 2013). Furthermore, 
glaring socio-economic inequalities in the country continues to be 
unabated. The National Statistics Census Board noted that in terms of 
the income distribution, 20 percent of the population (or the poorest 
segment) accounted for only 6 percent of the total national income, 
while the upper 20 percent accounted for nearly 50 percent (Philippine 
Daily Inquirer 2013a). “Liberalization has continued to be criticized 
for failing to resolve the fundamental problem—the growing gap 
between a small, wealthy elite and the majority poor, both within the 
Philippines and internationally” (Yap 2007). This has been noted by 
the Economic Planning Secretary Arsenio Balisacan, who admitted 
that the biggest continuing challenge to the Aquino administration is 
for this to benefit the majority of the Filipinos, and that the only way 
for growth to be inclusive is for poverty to be structurally addressed 
and the huge income inequality narrowed (quoted in Philippine Daily 
Inquirer 2013b).
The insulation of the technocrats in their policy-making efforts has 
been reinforced by the dominance of the neo-liberal paradigm. This is 
because its main propagators, the WB and the IMF have continued 
their alliance with the country’s technocrats and in the process 
have shielded them from domestic political pressure (Tadem 2009, 
41). This is particularly seen in the difficulty of the FDC in getting 
the government to declare a debt moratorium on a debt which the 
Philippines has already paid so many times over. As Akbayanparty-list 
representative Walden Bello pointed out, the need to fully service the 
foreign debt has led to the imposition of a 12-percent value-added tax 
(quoted in Uy 2010).
THE WEAKNESS OF THE PHILIPPINE 
LEFT MOVEMENT
The failure to successfully put forward an alternative development 
paradigm is also blamed on the weakness of the Philippine left movement. 
This has been attributed to the following factors: One is the split in the 
left movement, which prevents the movement from presenting a united 
front against the dominance of the politico-economic elites. Second 
is that the CPP-NPA-NDF continues to maintain their traditional 
armed insurgency strategy in the post-Marcos era, which has turned 
away potential supporters to their cause. This is because such a strategy 
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has been quite radical and uncompromising, and continues to rely 
mainly on violent and military measures for revolutionary causes. This 
has enabled the traditional political elites and the military, which are 
considered as the two most prominent ultra-conservative forces, to use 
it “as a pretext for justifying the status quo and defending their vested 
interests” (Park 2008, 129). A third reason is that the politico-economic 
elites have undermined the electoral efforts of the left movement, as 
seen in the party-list system of representation. The party-list system 
of representation was instituted in the 1987 Philippine Constitution 
to allow for members of the marginalized sectors to be represented in 
Congress. Six percent of the votes cast for the party-list system gives the 
party three seats, the most number of seats a party-list party could get. 
Four percent of the votes on the other hand gives a total of four seats, 
while 2 percent of the votes is equal to two seats. Although initially the 
politico-economic elites supported left parties in the party list system, 
through the years, they began to run their own parties in the party-list 
system. This has led left movement members to ally with traditional 
politicians to win in the party-list system. A result of this alliance is 
a compromise of their advocacies. This was seen when the Agrarian 
Rural Concern (ARC), a party-list party identified with the Philippine 
Ecumenical Action for Community Empowerment, an NGO identified 
with the RJ-faction which allegedly believes in urban armed struggle, 
forged a tie-up with Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a traditional 
politician, whose support ARC received in exchange for Santiago’s son 
being the no. 1 party-list candidate of the ARC. Such a move brought 
forth a split in the NGO. A fourth reason is that members of the left 
have also cast their support on traditional politicians to gain a foothold 
in national politics. During the 2010 May presidential elections, Bayan 
Muna, a party-list party identified with the CPP-NPA-NDF, cast its 
support for the presidential candidate of Manny Villar. As for the left 
RJ-identified party-list parties of Akbayan and Sanlakas, they supported 
the presidential candidacies of Simeon Benigno Aquino and Joseph 
Estrada, respectively. Akbayanis now in power because of the victory of 
Aquino. But the problem is that there seems to be no distinction between 
their development agenda with the neo-liberal development agenda of 
the current Aquino administration. Moreover, their recruitment into 
the government bureaucracy is mainly because of their personal ties 
with the president, and they do not bring with them their party agenda 
or program, if it has one at all. Thus, the relationship becomes one of 
patronage and cooptation by the traditional elites of left party politics.
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Reid (2008, 23–25) has referred to such a relationship as one of 
semi-clientelism in describing NGO activists who were recruited into 
the Estrada and Macapagal-Arroyo administrations. In the former, 
one had Horacio “Boy” Morales, leader of the popular democrats, for 
example, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and in the latter, Corazon 
“Dinky” Soliman as Secretary of Social Work and Development. 
Soliman is identified as one of the foremost leaders of the social 
democrats. As Reid noted, the need of Estrada and Macapagal-Arroyo 
for these NGO activists was to put a “face” in their administrations 
which was pro-poor. What surfaces is a “consistent trend toward 
pragmatism and seeking dubious and even opportunistic alliances 
become apparent” (ibid.).
Another concern with the reformist activities of NGO players is 
exemplified by Gawad Kalinga, which is a “highly successful provider 
of housing to the poor” (Pinches 2010, 304) and is viewed as a “vehicle 
for tangible intervention in the arena of need and political struggle, 
and . . . a discourse of class construction, through which middle class 
actors connect, but command and distance themselves from the masa” 
(ibid., 306).
Like the charismatic movement El Shaddai, “modernist 
transformation and upward mobility are achieved without regard to 
the structures of social and political inequality addressed by the less-
celebrated less well-funded left middle class activists” (ibid.).
CONCLUSION
This paper has thus shown the nature, as well as evolution, of the 
contestations over development models in the Philippines. A basic 
bone of contention since the pre-martial law period and up to the 
present is a clamor for genuine agrarian reform program to address 
poverty, underdevelopment, and glaring socio-economic inequalities. 
Up to the present, this has not yet been attained, given the dominance 
of the landed politico-economic elites in the country—with no 
less than the current President Benigno Aquino himself and his 
democracy icon mother former President Corazon C. Aquino coming 
from one of the most prominent landed classes in the family, i.e., the 
Cojuangcos and Aquinos of Tarlac. Such a status quo has spawned two 
communist movements, the PKP in the 1950s, and the CPP-NPA-
NDF in the 1970s which have continued to challenge this travesty. 
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Such a situation was further aggravated when the Philippines pursued 
the IMF/WB Bank prescription for development in the 1970s, of 
an export-oriented industrialization (EOI) development thrust and 
liberalization favoring foreign investors and capital. This went against 
the economic policies of a faction of the elites, which advocated 
for a nationalist industrialization through an import-substitution 
industrialization. During the martial law period, the EOI policy won 
out, and together with this was the opening up of the economy to 
foreign investors and MNCs, particularly in the agricultural sector. 
This witnessed the displacement of hundreds of communities to pave 
the way for local and MNCs agricultural joint ventures. To address the 
growing poverty in the countryside, development NGOs connected 
with the left movement that emerged with financial support from 
foreign governments and NGOs, to institute livelihood projects to 
develop self-reliant communities. The reality, however, was NGO 
development work could not be separated from the political, i.e., the 
anti-dictatorship movement. As for the local business community, 
resentment was placed on the perpetuation of the economic interests 
of the Marcos cronies, particularly in the major export industries of 
sugar and coconut, as well as with the incentives being given to foreign 
capital as advocated by the government’s adopting the IMF/WB 
policy of liberalization.
With the downfall of the dictatorship in 1986, members of the 
left continued to pursue NGO development work with the help 
of foreign government and NGO donors to address poverty in 
the countryside. Related to this continuation were the cooperative 
experiments of prominent former leaders of the CPP-NPA-
NDF. This was to bring forth development to the countryside or 
the marginalized peoples of Philippine society. But the dominant 
development paradigm continued to be the IMF/WB’s development 
prescription of liberalization, this time coupled with the push for 
privatization and the strengthening of the market economy as 
opposed to a state-led development strategy. The major criticism, 
however, on this was the failure of IMF/WB policies during the 
martial law period, which left the country with millions of dollars of 
debt. This gave birth to the FDC, a broad coalition of left political 
blocs demanding the following: (1) selective repudiation on debt, (2) 
a 10-percent debt cap, and/or (3) a moratorium on debt payments 
to allow for the country to develop. As the targets were the IFIs, 
the FDC was a local movement which became transnational and 
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was eventually supported by foreign governments and NGOs. The 
dominance of the neoliberal paradigm also placed focus on the 
social movements’ campaign against privatization particularly in the 
social service sectors, i.e., energy and water. Among the arguments 
were that privatization does not necessarily mean more efficiency, 
and, in fact, the experience shows that it has been characterized by 
corruption and rent-seeking. The other major development bone of 
contestation was the Philippines’ accession to the WTO despite unfair 
international trade rules and regulations. This gave birth to the SNR 
coalition, a broad coalition of NGOs, social movements, and civil 
society players among others, which was inspired by transnational 
social movements in the anti-globalization struggle. The movement, 
which was supported by foreign NGO donors, campaigned against 
the launching of a new round of negotiations in the WTO, with 
focus on the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Cancun 
in 2003.
The era of globalization also witnessed a variety of strategies used 
by social movements to contest the dominant development models. 
The democratization period enabled the social movements to make 
use of the executive, legislature, and the judiciary as arenas where 
they could bring forth their contestations of their issues and concerns 
against the neo-liberal development paradigm. One also witnessed the 
collaboration of civil society players with “reformist” technocrats in 
the bureaucracy in coming up with a Philippine negotiating policy on 
the WTO AoA, which pitted the developing states vs. the developed 
states. The strength of the social movements drew from local and 
transnational alliances, networking, and coalitions. A major form has 
been through protest actions at the national, regional, and international 
levels. Their efforts were given impetus with the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis and the 2008 global economic crisis, testimonies of the failure of 
the neoliberal development paradigm.
Arduous challenges, however, remain. These include mainly the 
continuing dominance of the politico-economic landed elites that 
have continuously blocked the implementation of an agrarian reform 
program and that have continually engaged in corruption and rent-
seeking in economic policies such as privatization. Secondly, is the 
continuing dominance of the neo-liberal development paradigm 
and the consequent insulation of technocratic policy-making from 
public pressures and intervention. And lastly, the weakness of the left 
movement to provide a feasible alternative development paradigm 
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This has been mainly attributed to the split in the left movement; 
the dominance of the politico-economic elites in electoral politics in 
particular, undermining left movement’s efforts in the party-list system 
of representation; and, lastly, the cooptation of social movement players 
by traditional politicians.
NOTES
1 This article is a revision of the paper entitled, “Contemporary Contestations over 
Models of Economic Development: The Philippine Experience,” which was presented 
at the WP4: National and Transnational Exchange of Information: New Models of 
Development and Conservation in Southeast Asia, Programme on Integration in 
Southeast Asia Trajectories of Inclusion, Dynamics of Exclusion (SEATIDE), EFEO 
Centre, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 13 February 2014. The author wishes to thank the 
two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions, but she bears the 
responsibility for all the views expressed here.
2 Nepomuceno A. Malaluan is a senior trustee and policy analyst of the Action for 
Economic Reform (AER).
3 Its members include Coffee Foundation of the Philippines, the Federation of Free 
Farmers, National Federation of Hog Farmers Inc., Philippine Association of Meat 
Processors Inc., Philippine Institute for Rural Development Studies, and the Philippine 
Sugar Millers Association.TF-WAR members from the private sector include the 
Philippine Chamber of Food Manufacturers, National Onion Growers Cooperative, 
Philippine Association of Hog Raisers Inc., Sanduguan, Pambansang Kilusan ng mga 
Samahang Magsasaka, Caucus of Development NGOs, and Philippine Business for 
Social Progress. 
4 The G20 is composed of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
5 G33’s agenda is for developing countries to be allowed to self-designate certain 
strategic products that would not be subjected to tariff reductions or new 
commitments and to institute a special safeguard mechanism to protect their 
domestic markets. Its members are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, 
Bolivia, Botswana, China, Cote d’Ivore, Congo, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Korea, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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